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GERALD FORNWALD* 
In today's Information Age, higher education has come to play 
an increasingly important role in the creation of individual economic 
success. 1 The American economy, especially that of the inner city, is 
no longer generating jobs capable of supporting a family for workers 
with poor literacy and math skills.2 Therefore, today's working poor 
have a more pressing need than ever for higher education as a tool for 
breaking the cycle of poverty. 
Currently, however, higher education tends to preserve eco-
nomic success in the hands of those who already possess it, rather 
than create a catalyst for under-privileged mobility.3 Affirmative 
steps must be taken to open the doors of our colleges and universities, 
including those of our most elite institutions, to those deserving stu-
dents most in need of the advantages of higher education. While 
standardized test scores and grades are fairly indicative of a high 
school. graduate'S likelihood of success in college, these snapshots do 
not paint a complete picture of any student's potentiaL In order to 
fully appreciate one's aptitude, it is necessary to take into account the 
unique obstacles that person has already overcome in attaining his or 
her current position. In modem American society, where "we have 
the most unequal distribution of income of any industrial nation in 
the world"4 and where money can be exchanged for an uncountable 
* J.D. candidate, University of St. Thomas School of Law; B.A., Creighton University. 
My thanks to Prof. Tom Berg for his guidance in writing this comment. 
1. Laura D'Andrea Tyson, Needed: Affinnative Action for the Poor, Bus. Week Online, 
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/contentl03_271b3840045_rnz007.htm (July 7, 2003). 
2. Deborah C. Malamud, Class-Based Affinnative Action: Lessons and Caveats, 74 Tex. L. 
Rev. 1847, 1861-62 (June 1996). 
3. See e.g. Natl. Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, Lutz Berkner & c. Dennis Carroll, Access to 
Postsecondary Education for the 1992 High School Graduates, http://nces.ed.gov/pubsearch/pubs 
info.asp?pubid=98105 (Oct. 9, 1997); Anthony P. Carnevale & Stephen J. Rose, Socioeconomic 
Status, RacelEthnicity, and Selective College Admissions (The Cent. Found. Mar., 2003) (availa-
ble at http://www.tcf.orglPublicationslEducationlcarnevale_rose.pdf). 
4. Richard D. Kahlenberg, The Remedy 91 (Basic Books 1996) (quoting Labor Secretary 
Robert Reich). 
199 
200 UNNERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 2:1 
legion of advantages (both educational and other), failure to take into 
account the economic disadvantage of the poor and working class is 
both inexcusable and an inaccurate system for the purpose of deter-
mining college admission. 
The level of one's educational attainment, although historically 
a powerful indicator of an individual's potential economic success, 
has gained greater weight recently. In 1990, the average male high 
school graduate age 25 and older earned 68 percent of his counterpart 
with a bachelor's degree.5 Just ten years later, that same high school 
graduate could expect to earn less than 61. percent of what his bache-
lor's degree-holding peer made.6 This same trend is present for wo-
men, albeit at a slower pace. Additionally, and not surprisingly, these 
discrepancies in income become even more magnified as the educa-
tional gap between two individuals is widened, regardless of gender.7 
Just as increasing one's level of education is a valuable tool for 
attaining economic success, the quality-or perceived quality-of 
that education can dramatically influence an individual's opportuni-
ties. Prospective students face substantial advantages if they are able 
to attend a selective college.8 One such advantage is a greater likeli-
hood of graduating. "Though intuitively one might think that gradua-
tion rates would fall for less-prepared students in rigorous academic 
programs, in fact those students graduate at higher rates than if they 
would if they had attended less.,selective schools."9 According to one 
extensive study, 86 percent of students who initially enrolled in a top-
tier college graduated, while comparable rates. fall to 71, 61, and 54 
percent as one proceeds down the tiers of selectivity.lO Naturally, 
one might suggest that the reason for the superior graduation rates of 
top-tier universities is directly tied to the caliber of students admitted. 
Even when adjusting for test scores, however, students who attend 
top-tier universities have a higher graduation rate than those attend-
5. Natl. Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, Digest of Education Statistics, tbl. 381 (2002) (available at 
http://nces.ed.gov!programs!digestld02!dt381.asp). 
6. Id. 
7. Id. 
8. Richard D. Kahlenberg, Economic Affirmative Action in College Admissions: A Progres-
sive Alternative to Racial Preferences and Class Rank Admissions Plans 2 (The Cent. Found. 
Issue Br. Series, 2003) (available at http://www.tcf.orglPublicationslEducationlkahlenberg-affac-
tion.pdf). 
9. Id. at 6. 
10. Carnevale & Rose, supra n. 3, at 12 (defining "top-tier" as the 146 most selective 
colleges). 
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ing a college of any other selectivity level. 11 Graduation, in tum, has 
a significant influence on the future earning power of students. In 
2000, full-time workers who had attended some college but did not 
complete a degree earned 25 percent less than similarly situated indi-
viduals who held bachelor's degrees.12 
A higher graduation rate is not the only advantage of attending a 
more selective university. Students attending more selective colleges 
are far more likely to pursue post-graduate education. In a compari-
son of equally qualified high school students, those who attend a 
more selective university experience higher rates of acceptance at 
graduate and professional schools. 13 "Among students scoring above 
1200 on the SAT, 48 percent of those attending selective colleges go 
on to attend graduate school compared with 26 percent of those at-
tending less competitive and noncompetitive schools."14 While com-
pleting a bachelor's degree gives a graduate a substantial economic 
advantage over non-degree holders, the completion of a master's or 
professional degree creates enormous advantages. IS 
Based on these figures, it is obvious that educational achieve-
ment translates almost directly into increased economic status. Edu-
cation is the most powerful tool for the intergenerational transmission 
of wealth as well as being an eradicator of the effects of intergenera-
tional economic disadvantage. 16 As the level of parental education 
increases, so does income; with increased income comes greater in-
vestments of time and resources in the education of children, and 
thus, greater success in high school and a higher level of prepared-
ness for college. 17 
This paper will begin by examining the shortcomings of our cur-
rent system of racial affirmative action. While racial preferences 
have sparked some advancement for certain minority groups, those 
11. [d. at 13. "[AJmong students who score above 1200 on the SAT/ACT, 96 percent gradu-
ate from top-tier institutions, 86 percent graduate from second-tier colleges, and 75 percent gradu-
ate from third- and fourth-tier colleges. For those with an SAT-equivalent score between 1000 and 
1100, 86 percent graduate from top-tier colleges, 83 percent from second-tier institutions, 71 per-
cent from third-tier colleges, and only 67 percent graduate from the 429 fourth-tier colleges." [d. 
12. Nat!. Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, supra n. 5. Men who had attended some college but did 
not hold a degree earned, on average, $40,337 compared to $56,334 for those who completed a 
bachelor's degree. For women, the numbers are $28,697 and $40,415. [d. 
13. Carnevale & Rose, supra n. 3, at 11. 
14. KalIlenberg, supra n. 8, at 2. 
15. See Nat!. Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, supra n. 5. 
16. Malamud, supra n. 2, at 1881. 
17. Carnevale & Rose, supra n. 3, at 32-33. 
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improvements have neither been drastic enough nor sufficiently in-
clusive of those most in need of assistance. 
The next section will introduce the theory of economic affirma-
tive action. In examining this proposed system of preferences for the 
economically disadvantaged, this paper will layout three reasons 
why affirmative action should incorporate an economic focus instead 
of a racial one: First, economic preferences are subject to a lower 
level of court scrutiny than racial classifications. Second, a color-
blind affirmative action policy is more popular n<;l.tionally than a ra-
cial policy. Third, if implemented correctly, economic affirmative 
action could foster even greater advancement for racial minorities, 
especially for those most in need, than the current race-based system. 
The third section of this paper will address the implementation 
of an economic affirmative action policy. This section will examine 
the failings of a previous economic preference system and introduce a 
refined method of calculating economic disadvantage consisting of 
three elements: First, family income over a three-year period must be 
taken into account. Second, family wealth, or net worth, is a neces-
sary consideration. Finally, the poverty density of an applicant's high 
school must be examined. These three criteria are both extremely 
influential to a student's likelihood of academic success as well as 
easily measured. Together, they provide an accurate measurement of 
the obstacles an individual has overcome in obtaining his or her cur-
rent academic standing. 
Finally, this paper will dispel the myth that racial classifications 
are an appropriate consideration for universities in their quest to 
achieve student diversity. Not only are racial preferences questiona-
ble on a constitutional level as a means of achieving such a goal, but 
they may also be less effective in assembling a diverse student body 
than a system of economic preferences. 
A CALL FOR REPLACING RACIAL AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
"If college opportunities are restricted to those in higher income brackets, 
the way is open to the creation and perpetuation of a class society which has 
no place in the American way of life."18 As harrowing as this admonition 
by President Truman's Commission on Higher Education seems, its mes-
18. Kahlenberg, supra n. 8, at 9 (quoting President's Comrnn. on Higher Educ. vol. 2, 23 
(1947)). The Commission on Higher Education, established by President Harry S. Truman in 
1946, was a task force designed to garner public and political support for expanded access to and 
federal funding for higher education for all Americans. College of Education, University of Illi-
nois at Urbana-Champaign, The President's Commission Higher Education for Democracy, http:// 
www.ed.uiuc.edulcourses!eol474!sp98!truman.htrnl. 
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sage still rings true almost 60 years later. Students from the highest eco-
nomic quartile compose nearly three quarters of the enrollment at our 
nation's top-tier colleges.19 Juxtaposed with the fact that only three percent 
of those seats are filled with students from the lowest economic quartile, it 
becomes clear that there is a class division in elite institutions for higher 
education.20 
The disproportion of high-income students is not merely a top-tier phe-
nomenon, but rather permeates four-year colleges nationally. There is a 
nearly perfect correlation between family income and. the likelihood of a 
child pursuing a bachelor's degree.21 While more than 54 percent of 18 to 
24 year-olds from families earning at least $75,000 per year are either full 
time students in a four-year college or are graduates with bachelor's de-
grees, their peers in families earning less than $30,000 per year accomplish 
the same feat at a rate of 15percent.22 
Ignoring race, poor and working class students are actually worse off 
under the current college admission process than they would be if grades 
and test scores alone determinedadmission?3 Under a purely "merit" 
based system, the bottom half of students, as measured by income, would 
represent 12 percent of the student body in top-tier colleges.24 "Under the 
current system of race-based affirmative action, the bottom half actually 
does marginally worse than it would under the system of grades and test 
scores, dropping to a 9 percent representation."25 
By upholding the constitutionality of a system whereby racial prefer-
ences are legitimate, the Supreme Court affirmed the power of government 
19. Kahlenberg, supra n. 8, at 5. 
20. Id. 
21. U.S. Census Bureau, School Enrollment-Social and Economic Characteristics of Stu-
dents (Update): October 1998, Enrollment Status of Primary Family Members 18 to 24 Years Old, 
by Family Income, Level of Enrollment, Type of School, Attendance Status, Gender, Race, and 
Hispanic Origin: October 1998 http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/school/p20-
521dt.html. 
22. Id. The percentage of 18 to 24 year-olds who are full time students or graduates of four-
year colleges by family income is as follows: 
Family Income 
Less than $10,000 
$10,000 - $14,999 
$15,000 - $19,999 
$20,000 - $24,999 
$25,000 - $29,999 
$30,000 - $34,999 
$35,000 - $39,999 
$40,000 - $49,999 
$50,000 - $74,999 
$75,000 and over 
23. Carnevale & Rose, supra n. 3, at 38. 
24. Id. 
25. Kahlenberg, supra n. 8, at n. 15. 
Full-time Student or Graduate 
12.5% 
13.3% 
16.3% 
18.2% 
16.4% 
28.1% 
29.6% 
30.7% 
39.2% 
54.3% 
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"to act affinnatively to achieve equal opportunity for all.,,26 Equalopportu-
nity, although difficult to define, can be aptly described as the situation in 
which children born into families of different classes have the same chance 
of success.27 In the setting of higher education, however, that equality has 
not been attained in either racial or economic terms. While African Ameri-
cans constituted 15 percent of our nation's eighteen-year-olds in 1995 and 
Hispanics made up 13 percent of that group, they each comprised only six 
percent of the student body in top-tier colleges.28 Even more glaring is the 
absence of poor students, regardless of race, as "[t]here are four times as 
many African American and Hispanic students as there are students from 
the lowest [socioeconomic] quartile."29 Even among racial minorities, poor 
students are severely underrepresented. In a study of 28 selective universi-
ties performed by two former Ivy League university presidents-and af-
firmative action supporters-it was discovered that 86 percent of African 
American students fell into the middle class or better. 30 
Examination of these numbers raises one of the most common criti-
cisms of racial affinnative action: it "currently benefits the most advantaged 
minority students disproportionately, and does little to help poor and work-
ing class students of color."31 Critics of racial preferences suggest that 
those benefiting from affinnative action are minorities who have already 
risen from the lower classes.32 Such accusations are not without merit, as 
even racial affirmative action supporters do not contest the fact that middle 
and upper-middle class minorities receive the greatest benefit from the 
program.33 
Critics of racial affinnative action point not only to the fact that 
wealthy minorities benefit disproportionately from the system, but also to 
the fact that such benefits come at the expense of poor whites.34 Even 
twenty-five years ago, research showed that 29 percent of working black 
men made more than the median white worker.35 Applying racial prefer-
26. Regents of U. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 324 (1978). 
27. Kahlenberg, supra n. 4, at 83-91. 
28. Carnevale & Rose, supra n. 3, at 10. 
29. [d. at 11. 
30. Kalllenberg, supra n. 8, at 3 (citing William Bowen & Derek Bok, The Shape of the 
River: Long-Term Consequences of Considering Race in College and University Admissions 49 
(Princeton U. Press 1998)). 
31. [d. 
32. Malamud, supra n. 2, at 1861. 
33. "[TJhe economic class breakdown of affirmative action beneficiaries is attributable pri-
marily to systematic factors that favor the success of middle-income persons over lower-income 
persons generally." Laura M. Padilla, [ntersectionality and Positionality: Situating Women of 
Color in the Affirmative Action Dialogue, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 843, 882 (1997). 
34. Kalllenberg, supra n. 4, at 49. 
35. [d. at 45; James P. Smith & Finis R. Welch, Closing the Gap: Forty Years of Economic 
Progress for Blacks 10 (The Rand Corp. 1986). In 1980,29 percent of black men had a higher 
income than the median white income, up from 22 percent in 1970 and 12 percent in 1960. [d. 
Obviously, this statistic reveals a discrepancy between the incomes of working black and white 
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ences, therefore, results in a more economically advantaged black person 
receiving a preference over a white person 29 percent of the time. This 
significant minority of occasions lends strength to the assertion that the ap-
plication of racial affirmative action creates racial hostility.36 When the 
most advantaged minorities are given a preference over the least advantaged 
whites, the net gain in equal opportunity is diminished, and working-class 
white Americans are pitted against racial minorities rather than the two 
groups uniting together in a common struggle.37 
Critics of racial affirmative action also complain that it fails to take 
into account the reality that not all racial minorities have been equal victims 
of discrimination?8 Affirmative action preferences should be narrowly tai-
lored to provide actual victims with compensation?9 One viable alternative 
may be to eliminate race-based preferences entirely and replace the current 
affirmative action scheme with a system based on economic status.40 Eco-
nomic preferences would provide compensation only to those members of 
society who feel the ongoing effects of discrimination in a measurable 
way-evident in their current level of economic disadvantage.41 
ECONOMIC AFFIRMATIVE ACTION INTRODUCED 
Economic affirmative action, if properly implemented, would produce 
far greater economic diversity in our nation's colleges, while preserving the 
improvements created by racial preferences over the past forty years.42 The 
central idea behind economic affirmative action is to award a "plus" to col-
lege applicants from disadvantaged economic backgrounds based on famil-
ial economic status.43 Equal opportunity is optimized under this scenario 
because economic factors that would otherwise inhibit a student's chance to 
develop his or her natural talents are offset by a quantifiable preference.44 
Individuals from disadvantaged socioeconomic backgrounds will receive a 
greater opportunity to achieve social mobility, and society will receive the 
benefit of reduced concentrations of poverty and increased equality.45 
Americans, as perfect equality would require 50 percent of black workers to make more than the 
median white worker. If, however, this gap has continued to narrow over the past 25 years, as it 
did in the previous 20, racial preferences function to displace an ever-growing number of low-
income individuals who have a potentially greater need for assistance. 
36. Kahlenberg, supra n. 4, at 65. 
37. See id. 
38. /d. at 19. 
39. [d. 
40. Don Munro, Student Author, The Continuing Evolution of Affinnative Action Under Title 
VII: New Directions after the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 81 Va. L. Rev. 565, 570 (1995). 
41. Kahlenberg, supra n. 4, at 101-02. 
42. See Carnevale & Rose, supra n. 3, at 5. 
43. Cf Munro, supra n. 40, at 602. 
44. See Kahlenberg, supra n. 4, at 84. 
45. Richard H. Sander, Experimenting with Class-Based Affirmative Action, 47 J. Leg. Educ. 
472, 475 (1997). 
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Numerous reasons exist for replacing racial affirmative action with an 
economically based policy. Among them are three issues of practicality: 
economic affirmative action policies would call for a lower level of court 
scrutiny; such a system is not only more popular among courts, but also in 
the public at large; and economic affirmative action, if correctly imple-
mented, could preserve-if not improve upon-the quantifiable advance-
ments racial affirmative action has attained for minorities while creating 
benefits hereto never experienced by the poor and working class. 
COURT SCRUTINY 
Under the Equal Protection Clause, courts apply a three-tiered system 
of constitutional scrutiny when reviewing government preferences-strict, 
intermediate, and rationality review.46 While economic considerations are 
scrutinized under the least restrictive, rational basis standard, racial distinc-
tions are subject to the most restrictive, strict scrutiny standardY "In mod-
em-era affirmative action jurisprudence, federal courts have disfavored 
race-conscious programs, not because they object to the goals of those pro-
grams, but because they find fault with the use of classifications based on 
race per se as the means to achieve those objectives."48 
Racial classifications, it is feared, place a stigma on affirmative action 
recipients as undeserving of selection based on their merits, thus promoting 
a perception of racial inferiority, as well as racial hostility.49 As a result, 
racial classifications must be "narrowly tailored to further compelling gov-
ernment interests."5o If the government cannot demonstrate a truly compel-
ling goal, or the means of accomplishing that goal are not so tightly fitted as 
to eliminate any possibility that the program was motivated by an illegiti-
mate racial prejudice, racial classifications are necessarily unconstitutional 
due to the inherent "danger of stigmatic harm" that they possess.51 So long 
as skin color is the focus of an affirmative action policy, race-consciousness 
and even racial prejudice is promoted and any significant advancement to-
ward a "color-blind" society is unlikely.52 
While racial classifications are often frowned upon, "[mJost courts and 
commentators embrace some theory between pure equal opportunity and 
pure equal achievement" in order to obtain optimal justice.53 A seemingly 
obvious proposal, therefore, is economic affirmative action. Classifications 
46. Malamud, supra n. 2, at 1860. 
47. Id. 
48. Daria Roithmayr, Direct Measures: An Alternative Form of Affirmative Action, 7 Mich. J. 
Race & L. 1, 15 (Fall 2001). 
49. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 373 (2003) (Thomas & Scalia, JJ., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
50. Id. at 326. 
51. City of Richmond v. I.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989). 
52. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 228-29 (1995). 
53. Munro, supra n. 40, at 580. 
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based on economic status, because they are subject to the lowest level of 
judicial scrutiny, are presumptively constitutional.54 Legislatures are con-
sidered to be "constitutionally free" in terms of what economic legislation 
they pass due to the Court's lenient stance on the issue.55 As a result, de-
spite a strong historical correlation between economic status and race, the 
Court is likely to uphold an economic preference, absent intent to create a 
racial classification. 56 
PUBLIC POPULARITY 
A system of economic affirmative action based on economic disadvan-
tage is not an issue that garners only partisan support, but rather one that 
has national backing regardless of political identification, race, or social 
class. Even those vehemently opposed to racial preferences often concede 
that affirmative action is too deeply rooted in American society to be re-
moved altogether.57 While an overwhelming majority of Americans oppose 
racial preferences in college admission, as indicated by a number of recent 
polls, an almost inverse view is expressed when the public is asked to con-
sider preferences for economic obstacles. 58 
This public support transcends race and class. "Majorities of both 
blacks and whites said they favored policies that give specific preferential 
treatment in college admissions and employment to people from poor fami-
lies over those from middle-class or rich families."59 Likewise, support for 
preferences given to low-income students in college admissions finds over-
whelming support regardless of the family income of those individuals 
asked.60 While 73 percent of survey respondents from families with an 
income of $30,000 or less supported such a policy, a still robust 60 percent 
of those individuals from families earning $50,000 or more would give an 
admissions advantage to low-income students.61 
This trend also permeates both sides of the political spectrum. 
Refocusing affirmative action on economic grounds has found support 
among highly respected political players from both the left and right 
wings.62 "Conservatives see the idea as a way of moving toward a color-
54. Kahlenberg, supra n. 8, at 7. 
55. Malamud, supra n. 2, at 1859. 
56. Cf Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996). 
57. Munro, supra n. 40, at 587. 
58. Kahlenberg, supra n. 8, at 8. Public disfavor of racial preferences ranged from 56% to 
68% depending on the source, while public support for preferences given to economically-disad-
vantaged students ranged from 57% to 65%. Id. 
59. Sam Howe Verhovek, In Poll, Americans Reject Means but not Ends of Racial Diversity, 
N.Y. Times Al (Dec. 14, 1997). 
60. Camevale & Rose, supra n. 3, at 30-31. 
61. Id. 
62. See Steven A. Holmes, Mulling the Idea of Affirmative Action for Poor Whites, N.Y. 
Times E3 (Aug. 18, 1991). 
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blind society whereas liberals perceive benefits in building a consensus on 
civil rights and in redistributing increased aid to the poor and working clas-
ses.,,63 A recent survey indicates that 72 percent of Democrats believe that 
at least some preference should be given in college admissions to low-in-
come students, while 64 percent of Independents and 60 percent of Republi-
cans support the same proposition.64 Even the two most conservative 
justices on the Supreme Court, Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas, have 
endorsed the idea.65 
Generally, Americans express the view that programs that help people 
to arrive at a place on the same "starting line" are favorable. 66 That starting 
line inevitably must refer to consideration for college admission, because 
the public considers "educational institutions [to] have the primary role 
among American institutions for promoting upward mobility. "67 These 
preferential programs must also focus on economic disadvantage, as a 
greater number of Americans associate disadvantage with poverty than with 
race.68 While people also consider a fair system to be one that honors 
"merit," in combining college admissions with the public's demand that 
economic disadvantage be considered, admissions should not merely be 
based on a student's academic record, but also on the obstacles one had to 
overcome in order to achieve that standing.69 
BENEFITS PRESENTED TO RACIAL MINORITIES 
In advocating for a system based on economic preferences, one cannot 
say in good faith that racial affIrmative action has been a complete failure in 
diversifying college admissions. Thomas Kane of UCLA estimates that at 
the top 20 percent of colleges where race is a factor in admissions, the 
average Mrican American applicant receives a benefit equal to 400 SAT 
points or two-thirds of a grade point on a four-point scale.70 As a result, 
racial preferences triple the number of African American and Latino stu-
dents who would otherwise attend the nation's top 146 universities under a 
system that takes into account only grades and test scores.71 
Even racial affIrmative action proponents must admit, however, that 
economic preferences, at worst, are the second-best alternative to racial 
63. Munro, supra n. 40, at 602. 
64. Carnevale & Rose, supra n. 3, at 31. 
65. Kahlenberg, supra n. 8, at 7. 
66. Verhovek, supra n. 59, at AI. 
67. Carnevale & Rose, supra n. 3, at 29. 
68. Id. (indicating that 83% of those surveyed considered low-income status to be a 
disadvantage). 
69. Kahlenberg, supra n. 8, at 3. 
70. Id. at 2 (Thomas Kane holds a Ph.D. in Public Policy from Harvard University and is a 
Professor of Policy Studies and Economics at UCLA, where he has studied the impact of affirma-
tive action on college admissions.). 
71. Id. 
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preferences for minority students and are certainly a superior option to end-
ing affirmative action entirely.72 At their best, economic preferences would 
indirectly compensate for past racial discrimination, disproportionately ben-
efit minorities, and provide greater racial integration than that achieved 
even under the current system.73 
By employing an economic focus, affirmative action would actually 
compensate those racial minorities who have been the greatest victims of 
past discrimination better than the existing system, which disproportion-
ately benefits middle class minorities.74 Black families suffer from poverty 
at a drastically higher rate than white families. 75 This is not for lack of 
effort, however. In 1990, black households with a member employed full-
time for fifty or more weeks of the year were still more than three times as 
likely to be impoverished as similarly situated white households?6 By in-
stituting a preference system based on poverty status alone, nearly one-third 
of the beneficiaries would be African American. 77 
Under a system that lends assistance based on wealth and school pov-
erty density, minority applicants would continue to benefit disproportion-
ately, even when compared to white applicants of the same economic class. 
While the black median income is only 60 percent of median white earn-
ings, black wealth is an abysmal nine percent of white wealth.78 By giving 
a "plus" to college applicants from low-wealth families, the effects of racial 
housing discrimination and other causes of disparity in wealth will be di-
rectly combated by compensating those against whom discrimination has 
taken the deepest, and most tangible, tol1.79 
Likewise, by recognizing the burden placed on students who attend 
schools with a high poverty density and remunerating them for that burden, 
racial minorities will be disproportionately assisted. The same housing dis-
crimination that has prevented minorities from accumulating a comparable 
wealth to their white counterparts also tends to concentrate minorities in 
low-income neighborhoods.80 Poor African Americans are six times more 
likely to live in a densely impoverished community than poor whites.81 Ap-
pallingly, three-quarters of the population of our nation's most impover-
72. Munro, supra n. 40, at 570. 
73. Kahlenberg, supra n. 4, at 105. 
74. [d. at 104. 
75. Munro, supra n. 40, at 604 (indicating that in 1990, 31.9% of blacks fell below the 
poverty line, as compared to 10.7% of whites). 
76. [d. (stating that in 1990,9.6% of black households with a full-time worker fell below the 
poverty line compared with 2.9% for whites). 
77. [d. at 605. 
78. Kahlenberg, supra n. 4, at 168. 
79. See Roithmayr, supra n. 48, at 11. 
80. Sander, supra n. 45, at 495. 
81. Kahlenberg, supra n. 4, at 170. 
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ished neighborhoods are comprised of racial and ethnic minorities. 82 
Inevitably, with minority concentration in poor neighborhoods comes a dis-
proportionate number of minorities in our nation's poorest schools. While 
whites comprise 84 percent of the student body at schools with the fewest 
students receiving subsidized lunches, blacks compose only six percent and 
Hispanics five percent of those same schools.83 
Finally, in addition to the disproportionate benefit that an economic 
preference system would give to minorities, an unquantifiable drawback of 
racial affirmative action would be eliminated. By focusing on economic 
disadvantage, the "stigma" attached to racial preferences would no longer 
be a factor. 84 Any public perception that racial minorities have diminished 
abilities would no longer attach itself to affirmative action, as beneficiaries 
would be individuals who actually "possess backgrounds of economic dep-
rivation," rather than ones who obtain a preference based solely on the color 
of their skin.85 One's economic status, unlike his or her race, is not an 
immutable characteristic. In most instances, it is easy to visually discern 
that an individual is a member of a protected racial class, and therefore a 
likely beneficiary of affirmative action. However, while superficial indicia 
do exist as to an individual's socioeconomic background, one student can 
never be sure of another's socioeconomic level, making the stigma of pov-
erty much less likely to attach itself than the stigma of race. Economic 
affirmative action, therefore, would preserve the current benefits under a 
racial preference system by disproportionately benefiting minorities, while 
eliminating the major criticisms of the current system. 86 
INSTITUTING ECONOMIC AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
The purpose of economic affirmative action, then, is not just to 
achieve indirectly "the same result" as racial affirmative action, 
by covert means. The policy would provide a similar degree of 
overall racial diversity, but it would benefit a quite different 
group of African Americans and Latinos, high achievers who 
overcame economic deprivation-as well as a whole new cohort 
of working-class whites and Asians-all of whom deserve a place 
at the table of higher education that has hitherto been denied 
them. 87 
The most widely known implementation of affirmative action based on 
economic need succeeded in only half of what Richard Kahlenberg cor-
82. john a. powell, Socioeconomic School Integration - A Response, http://www.prrac.org/ 
full_text.php?texUd=738&item_id=7780&newsletter_id=59&header=Search%20Results (Nov.-
Dec. 2001). 
83. Carnevale & Rose, supra n. 3, at 36-37. 
84. Munro, supra n. 40, at 608. 
85. Id. 
86. See id.; see also Kahlenberg, supra n. 4. 
87. Kah1enberg, supra n. 8, at 5. 
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rectly described above as the purposes of economic affIrmative action. In 
1997, following the implementation of California's Proposition 209, elimi-
nating the state's ability to employ a system of racial preferences, the 
UCLA School of Law incorporated an extensive class-based preference 
program in an attempt to preserve diversity.88 
The program's success story is that it dramatically increased the socio-
economic diversity of the student body. The UCLA School of Law exper-
ienced a four-fold increase in the percentage of students from poor families, 
and "the proportion of students from low-income neighborhoods probably 
tripled."89 Along with this achievement, however, came a degree of failure. 
Under the new system, Latino admissions fell 26 percent and black admis-
sions declined by 72 percent from their historic averages.90 
Although UCLA's progress in creating greater economic diversity is 
admirable, the program's effects on minority admissions are startling. De-
spite the cause for concern, however, there are valid explanations for why 
minority admissions were so negatively affected, and similar results are pre-
ventable. The ftrst, and simplest, explanation for at least part of the drop-
off is the fact that minority applications fell sharply in 1997. African 
American students applied to UCLA at a 28 percent lower rate, and Latino 
applications were down 21 percent.91 UCLA was in the precarious position 
of being one of only three top-twenty institutions prevented from offering a 
race-based preference.92 It stands to reason that if no public institution 
could offer race-based preferences, minority application rates would return 
to normal for a school like UCLA, eliminating some of the negative results 
experienced by their class-based program. 
A second explanation for UCLA's loss of minority admitees is that, 
while minority groups benefited disproportionately from UCLA's class-
based system, the preference given under the new system was dramatically 
smaller than that available under the old racial affirmative action policy.93 
One of the cornerstones of an economic affirmative action plan is that the 
more disadvantaged an individual is, the more preference that student 
should receive in order to "level the playing field." However, the UCLA 
system placed a floor on academic performance-which they called their 
predictive index, or PI. If a student's PI-which is composed of the indi-
vidual's LSA T score and undergraduate grades, adjusted for the strength 
and degree of grade inflation of the undergraduate institution94-fell below 
625, that student could not be admitted, regardless of his or her level of 
88. Sander, supra n. 45. 
89. ld. at 473. 
90. ld. at 497-98. 
91. ld. at 492. 
92. ld. 
93. ld. at 497-98. 
94. ld. at 479. 
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economic disadvantage.95 Such a policy, as administered by UCLA, under-
mines the philosophy behind, and potential success of, economic affmna-
tive action. Under a racial preference program, UCLA had "often admitted 
blacks with PIs as low as 550 and sometimes 10wer."96 
Irrefutable statistical evidence indicates that academic success is di-
rectly correlated with familial economic status, and that racial minorities are 
the most economically disadvantaged segment of our nation's population.97 
Therefore, by raising its minimum academic requirements by 14 percent, or 
more, at the same time it went to a class-based system, UCLA dispropor-
tionately reduced the prospects of minority students, who are more econom-
ically disadvantaged and, therefore, likely have lower academic 
qualifications.98 The nexus of economic affmnative action rests on the pre-
mise that the more economically deprived an individual is, the greater the 
preference that student will receive. By setting, and in fact raising, a mini-
mum academic requirement, economic affmnative action will fail to com-
pensate those upon whom economic deprivation has taken its greatest toll. 
A final explanation for the UCLA system's failure in admitting minor-
ity applicants is the fact that familial wealth was not included in the prefer-
ence.99 By not giving a boost for low family wealth, minorities, and 
especially blacks, were disproportionately affected, as "[iJt is well known 
that African-American families have markedly less wealth than white fami-
lies of the same income level."100 
The UCLA system should be seen as a ray of hope, not an albatross, 
for economic affmnative action supporters. Its dramatic increase in creat-
ing socioeconomic diversity among the student body speaks for itself, and 
with a few minor adjustments, its failings in sustaining racial diversity are 
curable. The considerations in improving the system, however, are numer-
ous. Kahlenberg suggests that the ideal definition of economic disadvan-
tage requires an examination of seven obstacles: (1) parental income, (2) 
parental occupation, (3) parental education, (4) the presence or absence of 
two parents, (5) familial wealth, (6) neighborhood poverty concentrations, 
and (7) school poverty concentration. 101 While each of these considerations 
may be salient on some level, each one is not purely economic in nature, 
nor easily quantifiable. Parental occupation, for instance, is difficult to 
quantify, especially when put in the context of trying to compare a low-
level white-collar position with a skilled blue-collar one. Additionally, pro-
95. [d. at 484. 
96. [d. at 497. 
97. See Munro, supra n. 40; Kahlenberg, supra n. 4; Deborah C. Malamud, Affirmative Ac-
tion, Diversity and the Middle Class, 68 U. Colo. L. Rev. 939 (1997). 
98. Deborah C. Malamud, A Response to Professor Sander, 47 J. Legal Educ. 504, 505-06 
(1997). 
99. Sander, supra n. 45, at 485-86. 
100. Malamud, supra n. 98, at 507. 
101. Kahlenberg, supra n. 8, at 2-3. 
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viding a preference to a child from a wealthy single-parent household, who 
has received all of the advantages of that wealth, at the expense of an appli-
cant from an impoverished, but intact two-parent household is counterintui-
tive to the premise of economic affirmative action. Finally, the 
consideration of both neighborhood and school poverty density may pro-
vide an inappropriate double boost for one applicant at the expense of an-
other well-deserving one. In deciding which, and how many, factors should 
be applied to an economic preference system, it is critical to recognize that 
as the definition of socioeconomic-disadvantage is broadened, the less in-
clusive of racial minorities it becomes. 102 Additionally, as Kahlenberg con-
cedes, "a properly constructed economic preference program examines 
quantifiable information that is already provided by applicants seeking fi-
nancial aid and can be readily verified."103 
A successful economic affirmative action policy should strive to main-
tain, or even expand upon, racial diversity while increasing economic diver-
sity by appropriately compensating college applicants for the quantifiable 
obstacles they have overcome. At the same time, efficiency requires that 
the system be inexpensively employed and easily verifiable. In order to 
achieve each of these requirements, economic affirmative action calls for 
the incorporation of three elements in order to attain true equal opportunity 
in college admissions: average family income over the past three years, 
family wealth, and the poverty density of the school attended. 
INCOME 
The most straightforward measure of economic disadvantage is in-
come.104 The simplicity of income does not end in its measurement, how-
ever, but is also plainly evident in its effect on the chances of a young 
person obtaining a college education. As the income disparity between rich 
and poor grows, "there are signs that the relationship between income and 
college graduation is becoming stronger."105 . 
Eighty-six percent of 1992 high school graduates from families with 
incomes of $75,000 or more had at least minimal academic qualifications 
for admission to a four-year college.106 However, only 68 percent of mid-
dle-income families ($25,000-74,999) and 53 percent of low-income fami-
lies (less than $25,000) produced students with minimal qualifications.107 
The correlation between income and academic achievement is nowhere 
102. Sander, supra n. 45, at 502. 
103. Kahlenberg, supra n. 8, at 8. 
104. See Malamud, supra n. 2, at 1878. 
105. Tyson, supra n. 1. 
106. Nat!. Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, Lutz Berkner & C. Dennis Carroll, Access to Postsecon-
dary Education for the 1992 High School Graduates 29, hup://nces.ed.gov/pubsearch/pubsinfo. 
asp?pubid=98105 (Oct. 9, 1997). 
107. 1d. 
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more apparent than in national SAT results. Without exception, as family 
income rises, so do the SAT scores of a child from that family.108 
While it is clear that income has a tangible effect on academic success 
and is a necessary component of any economic affirmative action policy, a 
more difficult decision involves determining how to measure income. "Ac-
curate income measurement depends upon people's economic horizons, in-
cluding their foresight, credit constraints, and planning abilities."109 A 
family's past and future income plays a significant role in the current con-
sumption habits of that household.110 Therefore, a sophisticated analysis of 
economic well-being requires not just a snapshot of a household's income, 
but rather a longer view of their economic circumstances.1ll 
The need to consider a longer time frame when examining income is a 
more pressing consideration for low-income families than for others. While 
volatility of earnings has historically been on the rise for all income levels, 
low-income families experience a greater fluctuation in their income levels 
than middle and upper-income families. 1l2 Not only are their levels of in-
come volatility greater, but so too is the effect of any income volatility on 
low-income families. Low-income households must often incur high inter-
est rate debt in order to survive lean years and have less means to save in 
order to offset future fluctuationsY3 By looking at only one year's income, 
the family that has historically earned $20,000, but has the fortuity of earn-
ing $30,000 during the year that their child applies to college, has its in-
come grossly overstated. 
While a snapshot measurement of income is not fair to low-income 
families with volatile incomes, one need not examine too long of a period in 
order to develop an accurate measurement. "Three quarters of income vola-
tility is gone after one year and nearly all after three to four years."1l4 
Therefore, even though the longest period possible provides the best repre-
108. Kahlenberg, supra n. 4, at 99. In 1994, the corresponding average SAT scores for indi-
viduals based on family income were: 
Family Income 
Less than $10,000 
$10,000 - 20,000 
$20,000 - 30,000 
$30,000 - 40,000 
$40,000 - 50,000 
$50,000 - 60,000 
$60,000 - 70,000 
$70,000 or more 
SAT Score 
766 
812 
856 
885 
911 
929 
948 
1000 
109. Lily L. Batchelder, Taxing the Poor: Income Averaging Reconsidered, 40 Harv. I. on 
Legis. 395, 401 (Summer 2003). 
110. Id. at 402. 
111. Malamud, supra n. 2, at 1869. 
112. Batchelder, supra n. 109, at 397. 
113. Id. at 403. 
114. [d. at 423. 
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sentation of a family's true economic status, most of the inherent inaccura-
cies of annual income measurement can be addressed by simply using a two 
or three-year averagingYs 
WEALTH 
While income averaging provides a more sophisticated depiction of 
economic inequality than a mere snapshot of current income, it, alone, does 
not complete an economic analysis for affIrmative action purposes. Wealth 
measures the extent to which income or debt has accumulated in a family 
over generations, thus capturing the full degree of disadvantage or discrimi-
nation felt by a family over time. 116 
Wealth, like income, impacts life chances tremendouslyY7 High net 
worth relieves a household of its total dependency on income generated by 
occupation, and that economic freedom cushions it from market forcesYs 
Income volatility is also less detrimental to the wealthy family, as it can 
absorb the pressures of lean years through liquidating its wealth rather than 
being forced to rely on high interest debt to sustain its positionY9 
Wealth is distributed even more unequally than income in the United 
States, with the top ten percent of Americans owning two-thirds of the na-
tion's net worth. 120 Current economic and tax policies further assist this 
trend, as homeowners are rewarded with federal income tax deductions for 
local property tax payments and mortgage interest payments, and the real-
ized benefits from those deductions increase with the income level of the 
taxpayer. 121 Additionally, wealthier households capable of buying more 
expensive homes and homes that appreciate at a greater rate receive a more 
exaggerated benefit when they sell their personal residence and pocket the 
gain on that sale, tax free. 122 Therefore, not only do households with 
greater wealth experience greater immediate economic stability, but current 
economic policy enables such families to maintain their net worth, thus cre-
ating intergenerational stagnation in the distribution of wealth. 
115. [d. 
116. Kahlenberg, supra n. 8, at 4. 
117. Malamud, supra n. 2, at 1871. 
118. [d. at 1871-72. 
119. Batchelder, supra n. 109, at 401-03. 
120. Kahlenberg, supra n. 4, at 92; Malamud, supra n. 2, at 1871. 
121. Richard Rothstein, How Tax Code Worsens Education Gap, N.Y. Times B8 (Apr. 25, 
2001). Assuming that both households itemize their deductions (which is less likely for families 
with lower incomes) and both pay $10,000 in mortgage interest in a year, a married couple eam-
ing $350,000 would receive an income tax savings of $3,500 ($10,000 * 0.35), while a married 
couple earning $30,000 would receive a savings of $1,500 ($10,000 * 0.15) even though they paid 
just as much interest. See 26 C.P.R. § 1.163 (2004). 
122. 26 C.F.R. § 1.121 (2004) (excluding from taxation gains on the sale of a personal resi-
dence up to $500,000). 
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Because "wealth barriers" remain "strongly resistant to intergenera-
tional mobility"123 and wealth is perhaps the most powerful tool for the 
economic stability of a family, those households with a low net worth face a 
greater dependence on their annual income in order to sustain economic 
life. A lack of wealth is a major destabilizer. When compounded by in-
come volatility, it greatly restricts the opportunity for economic mobility for 
those who lack the freedom to take economic risks.124 Additionally, fami-
lies that lack wealth experience an impaired ability to plan for the future 
due to a constant fear of changing market forces. 125 The exclusion of the 
consideration of wealth from an examination of economic disadvantage is, 
therefore, an inaccurate means of establishing a system promoting equal 
opportunity . 
POVERTY DENSITY 
While focusing strictly on a household's economic status can provide 
substantial understanding into the level of one's relative disadvantage, fail-
ure to look beyond the walls of one's home hinders the development of a 
complete understanding of the way economics influence a student's educa-
tion. Like familial economic status, the economic well-being of one's 
school population plays a substantial role in determining that student's like-
lihood of . academic success.126 
"[S]tudents who attend schools that serve large numbers of low-in-
come students consistently perform worse on achievement tests than stu-
dents who attend schools that serve wealthier students."127 In fact, a 
student is twice as likely to fall into the bottom quartile of economic 
achievement if he or she attended a high-poverty school compared to a stu-
dent at a low-poverty schooL128 While, naturally, many students attending 
schools with a high poverty density are themselves economically disadvan-
taged, individual economic status does not fully explain the cause of these 
lower scores. When economically disadvantaged students are removed 
from densely impoverished schools and placed in schools attended by more 
affluent students, their academic performance improves. 129 In fact, the pov-
erty density of one's school may have an even greater impact on a student's 
academic performance than that student's individual level of economic dis-
advantage. When middle-class students are placed in high-poverty schools, 
they are more likely to be underachievers than a poor student attending a 
123. Malamud, supra n. 2, at 1871. 
124. See id. 
125. See id. 
126. Richard D. Kahlenberg, All Together Now 25-27 (Brookings Instn. Press 2001). 
127. Peter Zamora, In Recognition of the Special Educational Needs of Low-Income Fami-
lies?: Ideological Discord and Its Effects upon Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education 
Acts of 1965 and 2001, 10 Geo. J. on POy. L. & Policy 413, 414 (Summer 2003). 
128. Kahlenberg, supra n. 126, at 26. 
129. Zamora, supra n. 127, at 414. 
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middle-class schooL 130 Interestingly, middle and upper-income students do 
not experience a decrease in academic performance if at least 50 percent of 
the school population remains middle-class. 131 
Explanations abound for why academic achievement bears a nearly in-
verse relationship with school poverty rates. 132 One possibility points to the 
disparate funding allotted to schools based on a system of financing public 
schools with funds raised through state and local taxes-often property 
taxes.133 Even in the landmark case upholding the rights of states to fund 
schools by means of local property taxes, the Supreme Court admitted that 
"reliance on local property taxation for school revenues provides less free-
dom of choice with respect to expenditures for some districts than for 
others."134 Whatever the precise reason for low academic achievement in 
schools with impoverished student bodies, "the conditions of poverty or 
economic deprivation produce an environment which in too many cases 
precludes children from taking advantage of the educational facilities 
provided." 135 
While the exact reason for the phenomenon is unknown, the fact re-
mains that a student's likelihood of academic success appears to have a 
powerful correlation to the economic and educational backgrounds of his or 
her classmates.136 These trends are unmistakable, and until the poverty 
density of a school does not bear an inverse relationship with the academic 
productivity of its student body, a school's high density of poverty must be 
considered an obstacle deserving of preference in college admissions in or-
der for equal opportunity to be achieved. 137 
130. Kahlenberg, supra n. 126, at 27 (indicating that 37% of middle class students attending 
high-poverty schools are likely to underachieve, compared to 28% of poor students attending 
middle class schools). 
131. Id. at 110-11. 
132. See Zamora, supra n. 127. 
133. Ted Halstead, Rich School, Poor School, N.Y. Times A19 (Jan. 8, 2002). 
134. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 50 (1973). 
135. Zamora, supra n. 127, at 419. 
136. Kahlenberg, supra n. 126, at 25. Students from economically deprived backgrounds do 
better in schools with high-income popUlations, and higher income students tend to perform worse 
in low-income schools. Carnevale & Rose, supra n. 3, at 35; Kahlenberg, supra n. 126 at 26-27. 
137. While no national agency exists for the collection of data measuring the socioeconomic 
makeup of schools to the same degree that the census collects data on communities, the use of 
school poverty density is still a viable candidate for inclusion in an economic affirmative action 
program. Sander, supra n. 45, at 482. The Free and Reduced-Price Meals Program (FARM) 
provides free school lunch to students whose families live at or below 130% of the poverty line. 
Kahlenberg, supra n. 126, at 106. The program also provides reduced-price assistance to students 
whose families live at or below 185% of the poverty line. [d. These numbers are readily available 
and provide an accurate measure of a school's proportion of economic disadvantage. 
One study employing a subsidized lunch focus discovered "an inverse relationship between 
the percentage of students receiving subsidized lunches in high schools and the percentage of their 
students who took college entrance exams." Carnevale & Rose, supra n. 3, at 35. Accordingly, 
64% of students took a college entrance exam at schools where no more than 10% of the student 
body received subsidized lunches (high-income schools). Id. At the other end of the spectrum, 
only 37% of students attending schools where more than 30% of the student body received meal 
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IMPLEMENTATION 
Once the criteria for an economic afflrmative action program are de-
cided, the central idea is to award a "plus" based on the relative disadvan-
tage of each college applicant in comparison to that institution's applicant 
pool for the given year.138 Applied correctly, economic affirmative action 
could be as non-controversial in nature as current need-based scholarship 
programs. 139 
In order to determine which applicant is eligible for a preference, the 
college should employ a gradational method, whereby each applicant would 
fall into a "continuous sliding scale of relative economic position"14o based 
on each of the three criteria: family income, wealth, and poverty density of 
the high school attended. The gradational approach is a simple method 
whereby colleges can easily compare the economic positions of the appli-
cants and assign an economic rank for each individual criterion. 141 Col-
leges would then award applicants a sliding scale preference for each 
category in which they qualify as disadvantaged. The most disadvantaged 
applicant under each criterion would receive the largest preference. Each 
subsequent-or less-disadvantaged-student would then receive a smaller 
"plus" until the level of disadvantage .reached some pre-ordained cut-off 
point. Applicants falling beyond the cut-off point would receive no prefer-
ence. This method would account for each element of deprivation sepa-
rately, allowing a student to qualify for one preference even in the absence 
of the other two. Naturally, colleges may not flawlessly institute the level 
of preference to award for each criterion of disadvantage, as well as the cut-
off points at which schools will no longer award preferences, on the flrst 
try. Nevertheless, with an educated appraisal and some cautious trial and 
error, economic affirmative action is a viable, permanent alternative to our 
current race-based system in college admissions. 
THE DIVERSITY RATIONALE 
While arguments abound in support of the superiority of economic af-
fmnative action as a permanent tool for creating equal opportunity, one 
justiflcation for the use of racial classifications must still be addressed: the 
diversity rationale. In the development of affirmative action jurisprudence, 
the Supreme Court has identified "two cognizable governmental interests 
subsidies (low-income schools) took similar entrance exams. [d. Likewise, more than twice as 
many students per capita scored an SAT-equivalent of 1000 at high-income schools as those at 
low-income schools. Id. It is not surprising, therefore, that low-income students attending high-
income schools attend universities in the top two tiers of selectivity at twice the rate as low-
income students in high schools filled with their economic peers. Id. at 35-36. 
138. Cf Munro, supra n. 40, at 602. 
139. Id. at 609. 
140. Malamud, supra n. 2, at 1863-64. 
141. Id. at 1865. 
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sufficient to justify race-conscious programs: remedying the effects of past 
discrimination and fostering diversity."142 I have already demonstrated that 
economic affirmative action is an effective tool for remedying past discrim-
ination because it provides a "plus" to those college applicants who cur-
rently feel the palpable effects of discrimination, evident in their economic 
disadvantage. Additionally, economic affirmative action may be a superior 
tool for fostering diversity. 
The diversity rationale is premised upon the theory that the presence of 
students with diverse backgrounds "enhance[s] classroom discussion and 
the educational experience both inside and outside the classroom."143 In the 
recent landmark University of Michigan Law School case, the University 
posited the argument that a meaningful representation of groups that have 
been the historic victims of discrimination yields educational benefits 
through the introduction of diverse prospectives. 144 The Court accepted the 
argument and ultimately allowed racial minority group membership to be 
the subject of consideration in a university's conscious pursuit of diversity, 
requiring simply that such a program "must further the goal of enriching the 
educational environment." 145 
The use of a diversity rationale in support of racial classifications came 
into being in Justice Powell's opinion in Regents of u. of Cal. v. Bakke, 146 
in 1978.147 In Bakke, Powell approved the use of racial classifications for 
one purpose only: "the attainment of a diverse student body."148 Because 
Powell's opinion-providing the crucial fifth vote necessary to permit 
"some uses of race in university admissions"149 in the future-centered on 
grounds that differed from the other four justices, it was not until the recent 
Grutter v. Bollinger decision that the Supreme Court "finally put to rest the 
uncertainty surrounding the legal status of affirmative action in higher edu-
cation."15o In so doing, Grutter held that "fostering student-body diversity 
is a compelling state interest sufficient to justify the use of race as a factor 
in admissions decisions."151 
The proposition that "tradition and experience" reveal the substantial 
benefit to be received from a diverse student body is nearly incontrovert-
ible.152 Expert studies aptly demonstrate that student exposure to diverse 
142. Garrick B. Pursley, Thinking Diversity, Rethinking Race: Toward a Transformative Con-
cept of Diversity in Higher Education, 82 Tex. L. Rev. 153, 159 (2003). 
143. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 319. 
144. Id.; Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The Diversity Lie, 27 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Policy 385, 387 (Fall 
2003). 
145. Pursley, supra n. 142, at 189. 
146. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 265. 
147. Fitzpatrick, supra n. 144, at 396. 
148. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311. 
149. Id. at 326. 
150. Pursley, supra n. 142, at 153. 
151. Id. 
152. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 324. 
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viewpoints is essential in order to prepare an individual for success in our 
modern global marketplace. 153 What is less clear, however, is whether ra-
cial classifications are the optimal tool for pursuing this diversity. While it 
is difficult to contest the fact that the government has a compelling interest 
in promoting diversity in our nation's universities, preferences based on 
race for the purpose of fostering diversity stand on constitutionally shaky 
legs when juxtaposed with a system of economic preferences for two 
reasons. 
The fIrst of these reasons implicates the "narrowly tailored" require-
ment of strict scrutiny. In a 1989 opinion that lacks any mention of the 
diversity rationale, the Supreme Court cautioned: "Classifications based on 
race carry a danger of stigmatic harm. Unless they are strictly reserved for 
remedial settings, they may in fact promote notions of racial inferiority and 
lead to a politics of racial hostility."154 Again, even in its ruling that the 
diversity rationale makes racial considerations constitutionally legitimate, 
the Court repeated its previous admonition that the "means chosen to ac-
complish the [government's] asserted purpose must be specifically and nar-
rowly framed to accomplish that purpose."155 This requirement of narrow 
tailoring necessitates the consideration of race-neutral alternatives that 
could be workable in achieving a university's desired diversity.156 In mak-
ing this demand, some members of the Court have even gone so far as to 
require that racial classifications must fIt a university's desire to foster a 
diverse student body "with greater precision than any alternative means."157 
The application of strict scrutiny to racial classifIcations, alone, is a 
powerful arrow in the quiver of economic affIrmative action supporters. 
Proper economic classifIcations are not only a "workable" alternative to 
racial classifications, but may actually accomplish the goal of diversity with 
greater precision. Whether one supports racial preferences or not, the pres-
ence of economic classifIcation as a viable affirmative action alternative 
certainly casts an ominous shadow of doubt on whether the current system 
of race-based preferences appropriately meets the requirement of narrow 
tailoring. 
The second constitutional argument in direct opposition to racial clas-
sifications as a means of creating diversity entails duration. The Supreme 
Court recognizes that "race-conscious admissions policies must be limited 
in time."158 In accordance with this requirement, therefore, universities that 
choose to employ racial preference admissions programs recognize that 
153. Id. at 330. 
154. l.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 493 (emphasis added). 
155. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333 (quoting Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 908 (1996». 
156. Id. at 339-40. 
157. Id. at 379 (Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia, Kennedy, & Thomas, JJ., dissenting) (quoting Wygant 
v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280 (1986». 
158. Id. at 342. 
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"there is an implicit collateral assumption that fostering diversity through 
affirmative action is a project that will one day be satisfactorily com-
pleted."159 While racial affirmative action supporters can have limited suc-
cess defending their system of preference against the duration argument 
when promoting affirmative action as a remedial program-assuming these 
defenders assert that one day the discrimination that gave rise to the need 
for affirmative action will be extinguished, and thus affIrmative action is 
the proper remedy-the goal of fostering academic diversity is ongoing. As 
long as different viewpoints exist in society, universities will have an inter-
est in fostering the expression of those viewpoints on their campuses.160 In 
other words, "an interest in academic diversity does not have a self-con-
tained stopping point." 161 Therefore, diversity exists independent of 
race,162 and, as diversity will always exist, racial preferences are an uncon-
stitutional means of its promotion, especially in light of the existence of an 
economic alternative. 
In addition to the constitutional arguments that lend favor to a system 
of economic preferences, the actual goal of fostering diversity may find 
superior results under a system of economic affirmative action. Even the 
University of Michigan Law School policy that gave rise to the most recent 
Supreme Court defense of racial classifications as a means of fostering di-
versity recognizes that "there are many possible bases for diversity admis-
sions."163 Likewise, in his opinion that first introduced the diversity 
rationale, Justice Powell was clear in stating that race was not the only 
characteristic, but merely one factor among many that should be considered 
in a university's attempt to create a diverse student body.l64 In so doing, 
Justice Powell went on to commend Harvard College's concept of diversity 
that also included students from disadvantaged economic backgrounds.165 
If the goal behind the diversity rationale truly is to enhance the learn-
ing environment of a university by introducing students to a multitude of 
viewpoints,166 then the use of racial classifIcations in order to achieve that 
goal is simply underinclusive. If, however, Yale Law School Professor Pe-
ter Schuck's observation is correct, and "diversity is merely the current ra-
tionale of convenience for a policy that [affirmative action's defenders 
would] prefer to justify on other grounds ... [and] the heart of the case for 
affirmative action is unquestionably its capacity to remedy the current ef-
fects of past discrimination,"167 then the current system transcends the clas-
159. Pursley, supra n. 142, at 192. 
160. See Gruffer, 539 U.S. at 306. 
161. Pursley, supra n. 142, at 198. 
162. [d. 
163. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 338. 
164. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315. 
165. [d. at 322. 
166. GrUffer, 539 U.S. at 313-25. 
167. Fitzpatrick, supra n. 147, at 395. 
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sification of underinclusivity and borders on the realm of 
unconstitutionality. An examination through the lens of strict scrutiny 
reveals that racial preferences should be replaced by a system of economic 
preferences because racial affirmative action is neither a better fit than eco-
nomic affirmative action for creating diversity, nor can it withstand the re-
quirement that a race-conscious program be temporary in duration. 
The current system of racial preferences provides assistance to mem-
bers of only a few groups, and the beneficiaries are predominantly from the 
same economic class.168 Providing preferences to economically disadvan-
taged applicants, on the other hand, would not only preserve racial diversity 
in our nation's universities, but it would also drastically diversify the socio-
economic makeup of those campuses. Racial minorities who have been the 
historic victims of discrimination would retain their representation, and 
poor and middle class students would receive a substantial voice for the 
first time. 
CONCLUSION 
"The purpose of economic afftrmative action, then, is not just to 
achieve indirectly 'the same result' as racial affirmative action, by covert 
means."169 Rather, if implemented correctly, economic affirmative action 
could create true equal opportunity for all Americans, regardless of race. 
Racial minorities, as a group, will benefit disproportionately due to their 
lower incomes, substantially inferior wealth, and higher demographic con-
centration in low-income schools. At the same time, the most disadvan-
taged minorities will receive the largest preference, benefiting those 
individuals who have suffered the most from past discrimination. 
Not only will racial diversity be preserved, but socioeconomic diver-
sity will also skyrocket. Working class whites and Asians, who currently 
are deprived of the benefit of affirmative action policies, will be compen-
sated for the obstacles they, too, have overcome. This, in turn, will reduce 
the racial tension spurned by affirmative action's current focus on race be-
cause, even though African Americans and Latinos should continue to ben-
efit disproportionately, the justification behind any individual receiving a 
preference will be irrefutable. 
Equal opportunity is an essential component of American society. 
However, statistical evidence demonstrates that it cannot exist unless the 
obstacles created by economic disadvantage are addressed and remedied. 
Likewise, our rapid advancement in the Information Age requires, more 
than ever, that individuals have an adequate education in order to obtain 
economic mobility. Therefore, equal opportunity cannot exist until every 
individual is given the same prospect of receiving the higher education that 
168. Malamud, supra n. 2, at 1861. 
169. Kahlenberg, supra n. 8, at 5. 
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could free them from the bonds of intergenerational economic disadvan-
tage; and that can only be done once the intangible obstacles that person has 
overcome are recognized and recompensed. 
